). Although intriguing in its own right, interest in the CRE stems in part from the potential consequences of misidentification. For the perceiver, misidentification can elicit feelings of shame, scorn, or opprobrium. For the victim of misidentification, consequences can be more serious, leading to insult or, worse still, eyewitness misidentification. Given the reliance of the criminal justice system on eyewitness identification, and the weight that eyewitnesses are given in juridical decisions, understanding the mechanisms underlying the CRE has clear theoretical and applied implications.
The current research investigates the hypothesis that the well-established cross-race effect (CRE; better recognition for same-race than for cross-race faces) is due to social-cognitive mechanisms rather than to differential perceptual expertise with same-race and cross-race faces. Across three experiments, the social context in which faces are presented has a direct influence on the CRE. In the first two experiments, middle-class White perceivers show superior recognition for same-race White faces presented in wealthy but not in impoverished contexts. The second experiment indicates this effect is due to the tendency to categorize White faces in impoverished contexts as outgroup members (e.g., "poor Whites"). In the third experiment, this effect is replicated using different ingroup and outgroup categorizations (university affiliation), with ingroup White faces being recognized better than outgroup White faces. In line with a social-cognitive model of the CRE, context had no influence on recognition for cross-race Black faces across the three experiments.
Keywords: cross-race effect; intergroup relations; categorization; face recognition; contextual influences M ore than four decades of empirical research demonstrates that face recognition is more accurate for samerace (SR) compared to cross-race (CR) targets (Meissner & Brigham, 2001 ). This CR recognition deficit, or the crossrace effect (CRE), is a robust and widely replicable phenomenon across experimental paradigms and crosscultural settings (Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Ng & will degrade SR face recognition but not CR recognition. Critically, across three experiments we provide novel evidence that categorizing a target as an outgroup member, either via race or some other social distinction, debilitates face recognition, thus demonstrating the role of ingroup and outgroup categorization as a mechanism underlying the CRE. In defiance of perceptual expertise models, this phenomenon occurs even when perceptual expertise with the stimuli is held constant. Finally, we connect the social-cognitive models to the recent trends in the social-cognitive literature regarding context effects on attitudes and categorization.
Mechanisms for the CRE: Perceptual Expertise and Social Cognition Perceptual Expertise Models
Historically, the most popular and widely investigated mechanisms for the CRE have been variants of a perceptual expertise model. From the perspective of perceptual expertise theories, de facto racial segregation leads to the infrequent processing of CR faces relative to SR faces. Thus, from this perspective, greater expertise with SR faces, as compared to CR faces, is at the root of the CRE. Notably, the mechanisms by which expertise translates into recognition differ from theory to theory. Some theories propose that a lack of contact may lead to a dearth of expertise with the dimensions on which CR faces differ (see MacLin & Malpass, 2001) . Alternatively, lesser expertise with CR faces may elicit less holistic and more feature-based processing of CR faces, with these different processing styles accounting for the differential recognition (Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung, & Caldara, 2006; Rhodes, Brake, Taylor, & Tan, 1989) . Still others have proposed representational models to account for the difference, with differential representation of SR and CR faces accounting for differential recognition (Valentine & Endo, 1992) .
Despite their differences, all such explanations share the hypothesis that increased experience with CR faces should improve CR recognition. However, empirical support for this central hypothesis has been mixed (Sporer, 2001) . Although some studies have shown that extensive within-laboratory training (e.g., Goldstein & Chance, 1985; Malpass, Lavigueur, & Weldon, 1973) or lifelong experience with encoding CR faces (Sangrigoli, Pallier, Argenti, Venturevra, & de Schonen, 2005) can modulate the CRE, others have failed to find any relationship between level of contact and the CRE (e.g., Ng & Lindsay, 1994) . Indeed, the weak relationship between expertise and CR recognition seems endemic in the literature. In a recent meta-analysis of the CRE, Meissner and Brigham (2001) found that interracial contact accounts for only about 2% of the variability in the magnitude of the CRE. Thus, despite empirical support for many assumptions of perceptual expertise models, evidence for the central claim that more contact elicits better recognition remains unclear.
Social-Cognitive Models
In an attempt to provide satisfying theoretical alternatives for the CRE, several social-cognitive accounts recently have been proposed. Although these theories differ in some details, central to the social-cognitive model is the proposition that outgroup members elicit different social cognitions from perceivers than do ingroup members, resulting in the CRE (Bernstein, Young, & Hugenberg, 2007; Hugenberg, Miller, & Claypool, 2007; Levin, 1996 Levin, , 2000 . The social-cognitive model of the CRE, building on classic social-cognitive theory (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) , rests on the tendency for individuals to think categorically about outgroup members. Categorical thinking involves reliance on social categories (e.g., race, sex, age) instead of on targets' individual characteristics. Thus, the social-cognitive model argues that when encoding a face, perceivers are focused on the categorization of outgroup members but on the individuation of ingroup members.
Differentially categorizing and individuating outgroup and ingroup members can have a series of effects potentially detrimental to recognition of outgroup members. For example, the stimuli themselves may be seen as more perceptually homogeneous when categorized (Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963) . Treating individuals categorically rather than individuating them can also serve as a cue for cognitive disregard (Rodin, 1987) , with outgroup faces eliciting less attention and less processing at encoding. Differential categorization of outgroup members and ingroup members can also lead to a differential search for features among faces. Whereas the individuation of ingroup members leads perceivers to search for facial features that distinguish one ingroup member from another, the tendency to think categorically about outgroup members instead leads to a search for category-specifying features. Thus, whereas people encode individuating characteristics of SR faces, they encode category-specifying features at the expense of this individuating information in CR faces (Levin, 1996 (Levin, , 2000 . Taken together, these sequelae of categorization of outgroup targets and individuation of ingroup targets can account for the CRE.
This social-cognitive account of what has classically been considered a perceptual phenomenon aligns the CRE with similar effects in the social-cognitive literature, perhaps primary among them is the outgroup homogeneity effect. The outgroup homogeneity effect is the tendency to perceive members of outgroups as more similar to one another than members of ingroups. In one classic display, Judd and Park (1988) found evidence for an outgroup homogeneity effect in a minimal group paradigm and under conditions in which the number of ingroup and outgroup exemplars were equated. Thus, the mere assignment of individuals to social groups can be sufficient to elicit outgroup homogeneity effects. Such social-cognitive phenomena demonstrate a general theme: Outgroup members tend to be processed at the categorical level at the expense of individuating information (Ostrom, Carpenter, Sedikides, & Li, 1993) .
Testing the Social-Cognitive Model
Social-cognitive models of the CRE lead to predictions about what will affect the CRE that differ starkly from expertise models. Whereas the only recourse to reduce the CRE under an expertise model is extensive perceptual training (e.g., Malpass et al., 1973) , socialcognitive models offer a different solution: individuation. Although categorical thinking is common when thinking about outgroups, prominent theories of stereotyping note that thinking categorically about outgroup members is not inevitable. Instead, when perceivers are aware of their tendency to think categorically about outgroup members, are motivated to process deeply, and have available cognitive capacity, they may individuate. Recent evidence suggests that individuation alone, absent an increase in perceptual expertise, is sufficient to eliminate the CRE. Across three studies, Hugenberg et al. (2007) find that instructing White participants to attend closely to the features that distinguish one Black face from another substantially improves recognition of Black faces, eliminating the CRE. Other recent evidence suggests that strong motivation to process outgroup faces can also eliminate (or even reverse) the CRE. For example, for White perceivers, angry Black faces are recognized substantially better than are neutral-expression Black faces. For neutral faces, the classic CRE emerged; however, for angry Black faces, the effect reversed such that angry Black faces were better recognized than angry White faces (Ackerman et al., 2006) . Consistent with research demonstrating a perceptual advantage for threatening stimuli (Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001 ), these findings suggest that threat provides sufficient motivation to individuate CR faces.
Although these individuation data are congruent with a social-cognitive model of the CRE, they do not test the central assumption of the model: Categorizing a target as an outgroup member debilitates recognition. Consistent with this reasoning, Bernstein et al. (2007) recently demonstrated that categorizing even SR faces as ingroup and outgroup members was sufficient to elicit a recognition deficit empirically similar to the CRE. White participants were shown White faces that were categorized as either ingroup (i.e., same university, same personality type) or outgroup (i.e., different university, different personality type) members. When faces were believed to be outgroup members, recognition suffered as compared to faces believed to be ingroup members. Bernstein et al. (2007) raise the intriguing possibility that perhaps the CRE is a subset of this broader crosscategory effect. Although Bernstein et al. demonstrate the efficacy of ingroup and outgroup status in modulating face recognition, it remains unclear whether this process is implicated in the CRE or whether cross-category effects are simply one additional factor of many that bias both SR and CR recognition (e.g., visual conditions, viewing duration). Because Bernstein et al. do not measure CR recognition, direct comparisons between the crosscategory effect and the well-established CRE are not possible. The current work seeks to address this critical question by simultaneously manipulating both target race and an additional ingroup-outgroup distinction. To the extent that social categorization is a causal factor in the CRE, recognition should be weak regardless of whether the ingroup-outgroup distinction is one of race or some other group membership.
If the social-cognitive model can account for the CRE, categorizing a target as an ingroup or outgroup member should affect face recognition. We hypothesized that all faces categorized as outgroup members, whether by race or by another social distinction, would be poorly recognized. Thus, categorizing SR faces as outgroup members would attenuate the CRE by eliciting a drop in SR recognition. Critically, to the extent that this phenomenon causes the CRE, the strong version of our hypothesis is that recognition accuracy for outgroup SR faces should drop to a level at or near that for CR faces. In essence, categorizing an SR face as an outgroup member should eliminate the CRE, an interaction hypothesis.
In contrast, if race and group membership have independent effects on recognition, this would support perceptual expertise models, which propose the CRE is due to relatively stable differences in perceivers' expertise with SR and CR faces. Perceptual expertise models, therefore, hypothesize that if categorizing a face as an outgroup member influences face recognition at all (Bernstein et al., 2007) , this should occur equally for both SR and CR faces (i.e., two main effects). We turn now to the recent research on how social and environmental contexts can modulate evaluation, activation, and categorization as a potential means by which to test these provocative competing hypotheses.
Contextualizing the CRE
It is a truism in social psychology that context influences social cognition. Even from Asch's (1946) seminal work, it was clear that context plays a vital role in person perception. Specifically, the context in which trait words appeared (in combination with other trait words) influenced the way these traits were combined to form an overall impression of another person. Indeed, the influence of social context on cognition and behavior has been of perennial interest to social psychology. However, in typical CRE research, participants view both SR and CR faces sans context, laving away all of the richness afforded by the social contexts in which stimuli are typically embedded. This very context can provide critical information that perceivers can use to interpret or categorize others. Intuitively, encountering people in wealthy suburban neighborhoods can be different from encountering the same people in deeply impoverished neighborhoods. The assumptions perceivers make about others may differ, or the spontaneous categorizations of the people themselves may differ, across contexts.
For example, Barden, Maddux, Petty, and Brewer (2004) find that viewing Black targets in a positive stereotypic context (relative to a negative context) reduced White participants' implicit anti-Black bias. In this research, Black and White targets were presented in different social contexts. In their first study, Black and White targets were presented in a classroom (a context positively stereotypic of Whites) and in a basketball court (a context positively stereotypic of Blacks). In line with their hypotheses, although the typical pattern of antiBlack prejudice occurred when faces were presented in the classroom, the pattern reversed when the stimuli were presented in the basketball court. Barden et al. argue that the positive role of Blacks in this context elicits positive automatic evaluations of Blacks. Thus, automatic evaluation (i.e., implicit prejudice) in many real-world contexts is actually the result of a Race × Context interaction rather than an overall positivity or negativity toward a social group. In line with Barden et al.'s Race × Context argument, it seems likely that an environment or context leads to the activation of a subset of the broader social category information. Black targets in basketball courts activate the positively evaluated "basketball player" subtype of the broader Black category. In the same way, Black targets in factory contexts activate the "hard-working, blue-collar" Black subtype that is again more evaluatively positive than the omnibus Black representation. As Barden et al. note , the intersection of these multiple categories (e.g., Black factory worker) likely activates a specific subtype that elicits very different stereotypes and evaluations from the broader category alone.
Extending this logic to the CRE, we hypothesize that social context (e.g., suburban homes vs. trailer parks) will elicit differences even in how SR faces are remembered by changing how SR faces are categorized. In the case of middle-class White perceivers, White (i.e., SR) faces on backgrounds indicative of wealth will be considered ingroup members. The same White faces on backgrounds indicative of poverty, however, will be spontaneously categorized as "poor Whites," or some other negatively evaluated, exclusionary subtype of the White category. In short, middle-class Whites will categorize "poor Whites" as outgroup members. The literature on social class strongly suggests that many middle-class or wealthy individuals attempt to distance themselves from working-class or impoverished individuals (Lott, 2002) , a phenomenon that occurs both cognitively and behaviorally. Thus, for well-off Whites, categorizing SR targets as impoverished should be equivalent to outgroup categorizations.
Moreover, if social context affects spontaneous ingroup and outgroup categorizations, context could be manipulated as a means to critically test perceptual expertise and social-cognitive models for the CRE. The social-cognitive model predicts that when SR faces are placed in a context that elicits outgroup categorization, recognition of that face should be debilitated. In this case, SR faces categorized as outgroup members (e.g., as "poor Whites") would be recognized just as poorly as CR faces. In contrast, because expertise with the faces is unchanged, perceptual expertise models would predict no change in SR face recognition across contexts. Predictions for CR recognition in wealthy and impoverished contexts can also be drawn from the social-cognitive model. Both theory (Brewer, 1988) and evidence suggest that certain biologically based, perceptually salient categories, such as race, sex, or age, can be difficult to ignore. Stangor, Lynch, Duan, and Glas (1992) found that, for example, temporary accessibility manipulations have little effect on the tendency to spontaneously categorize targets along racial lines. If true, for White perceivers, Black targets will be categorized as outgroup members, and thus poorly recognized, regardless of the social context in which they are presented.
EXPERIMENT 1A
Experiment 1a tested the hypothesis that the social context in which both SR and CR faces were presented would modulate the CRE. We hypothesized that for middle-class White perceivers, White faces presented within impoverished contexts (e.g., dilapidated houses) would be poorly recognized compared to when the same faces are presented within wealth-implying contexts (e.g., large suburban homes). In support of the socialcognitive model of the CRE (and in direct contradiction of a perceptual expertise explanation), to the extent that the CRE is an outcome of ingroup versus outgroup categorizations, White participants' recognition for SR faces in impoverished contexts should drop to near the level for CR faces. Finally, insofar as race is difficult to ignore when making ingroup-outgroup distinctions, impoverished or wealthy contexts should not influence CR recognition.
Method Participants and Design
Thirty White Miami University undergraduates (16 females, mean age = 18.76 years) participated in exchange for partial course credit.
1 Four participants whose recognition performance was worse than chance in at least one experimental condition were eliminated from analyses; 1 participant was excluded because of experimenter error. This experiment employed a 2 (target race: Black vs. White) × 2 (target context: wealthy vs. impoverished) repeated measures design.
Stimulus Materials
Face photos. Sixty-four grayscale photos of male, college-aged faces (32 Black, 32 White), displaying neutral expressions, resized to approximately 2.25 × 1.5 in., were used as stimuli.
Context images. Thirty-two color context images (16 wealth implying, 16 poverty implying) resized to 8 × 10.67 in. were used as contexts (see Figure 1 for examples). Contexts were selected to imply either wealth or poverty. Impoverished contexts included dilapidated housing, run-down public spaces, prisons, and so on. Wealthy contexts included large suburban homes, golf courses, well-appointed classrooms, and so on. These background stimuli were rated by a separate set of participants (N = 12) on a 7-point Likert-type scale measuring the extent to which the background implied poverty or wealth (1 = very impoverished, 7 = very wealthy). As predicted, wealthy backgrounds (M = 5.74, SD = 0.26) were rated as implying substantially more wealth than impoverished backgrounds (M = 2.69, SD = 0.42), t(11) = 21.54, p < .001, d = 5.78.
Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants were instructed that they would participate in an experiment regarding face memory. Participants were assigned to separate computer workstations, instructed that they would view numerous faces presented within different contexts, and asked to attend to the faces and contexts for later recognition. Participants then engaged in the learning, filler, and recognition phases described next.
Learning phase. The learning phase consisted of 32 trials wherein faces (16 Black, 16 White) were presented in either wealthy or impoverished contexts. The faces and contexts were counterbalanced such that each face and context was seen with equal frequency at encoding.
2
Each trial began with a fixation point presented at the center of the screen for 250 ms. A context image was then presented at the center of the screen for 2 s. A stimulus face was then overlaid on the center of the context for an additional 3 s. The trial ended with the face being presented on a gray background for an additional 2 s.
Recognition phase. After an unrelated filler task, participants were asked to judge which of 64 faces (32 Black, 32 White; half previously seen, half novel) they had seen before and which they had not seen before. These 64 faces were presented in a separate random order for each participant. Each face was presented on a gray background, at the center of the screen, until participants responded via keyboard button press, after which the next face immediately appeared.
Results
Of primary interest was the extent to which wealthor poverty-implying contexts influenced the magnitude of the CRE. Within the CRE literature, the most common means of indexing recognition is using the signal detection parameter sensitivity (d′). Thus, the CRE is observed as lower d′ scores for CR than for SR faces. Sensitivity (d′) is a measure of perceivers' ability to discriminate between "new" and "old" faces that simultaneously accounts for accurate responses ("hits") and response bias ("false alarms"). To calculate this index, the z score for the false alarm rate is subtracted from the z score for the hit rate (Green & Swets, 1966 ). In the current experiment, hit rates were calculated separately for each of the four experimental conditions. Because faces were presented without contexts during the recognition phase, the novel faces never appeared in a context. Thus, false alarms were calculated by target race only. Therefore, within each race, d′ was calculated by using an omnibus false alarm score, rather than separate false alarm scores for wealthy and impoverished contexts, creating separate indexes of sensitivity (d′) for wealthy White, impoverished White, wealthy Black, and impoverished Black. to eliminate the recognition advantage that SR faces typically enjoy. Indeed, for White faces on impoverished backgrounds, recognition fares as poorly as for CR faces, regardless of whether impoverished White faces are compared to impoverished Black faces, t(24) = -0.92, p = .37, d = 0.18, or wealthy Black faces, t(24) = -0.89, p = .38, d = 0.18. Also as predicted, the economic status implied by the background has no effect on the recognition of Black faces. Regardless of wealthy (M = 1.08, SD = 0.61) or impoverished (M = 1.06, SD = 0.50) contexts, CR recognition was unaffected, t(24) = 0.15, p = .88, d = 0.03. Consistent with the findings of Stangor et al. (1992) , the race of these faces may simply be difficult or impossible to ignore when making ingroup and outgroup categorizations.
Discussion
Taken together, these data conform closely to the predictions of a social-cognitive model of the CRE. This model predicts that, to a great extent, the CRE is an outgrowth of categorizing stimuli as ingroup versus outgroup members. In other words, it is an effect of individuation and categorization processes. Thus, even holding constant the perceptual expertise with SR faces, recognition performance for SR faces drops to that of CR faces when the context implies that SR faces belong to a devalued subtype. Strikingly, recognition accuracy for SR faces in impoverished contexts was indistinguishable from recognition performance for CR faces (regardless of context).
These data suggest that the recognition advantage for SR faces observed in scores of CRE experiments may be surprisingly fragile. Although many perceptual expertise theories predict that stronger expertise with SR faces provides great efficiency in processing those faces, Experiment 1a suggests a simple boundary condition: categorizing the target as an outgroup member. In the social-cognitive literature, there is evidence that perceivers tend to not extensively process outgroup members, particularly when they are not perceived as a threat (Ackerman et al., 2006) or as otherwise functionally important (Rodin, 1987) . Thus, many individuals in our environment are "cognitively disregarded" and are encoded only at the level of category information. In contrast to the predictions of perceptual expertise models, the benefit typically seen for SR face recognition is eliminated when SR faces are presented in contexts that imply they are members of a devalued subtype, even when equating perceptual expertise with the faces themselves.
EXPERIMENT 1B
Although Experiment 1a provides initial support for a social-cognitive model of the CRE, it makes several assumptions about the processes involved. Specifically, the social-cognitive model of the CRE hypothesizes that the CRE itself follows from categorizations of targets as ingroup and outgroup members (see also Sporer, 2001) . In Experiment 1a, we relied on the assumption that the wealthy and impoverished contexts elicited spontaneous categorizations of SR faces as either middle-class White (i.e., the White ingroup) or poor White (or similar undesired, exclusionary subtypes; the White outgroup). Other than the recognition data from Experiment 1a, and their clear fit to the social-cognitive model, there is no guarantee that these contexts actually elicited a change in categorizations. To address this concern, a second experiment was conducted using a procedure nearly identical to that of the first experiment. In this experiment, the only difference was that White participants were asked to categorize each stimulus face by race and socioeconomic status immediately after they saw each face at encoding. If White perceivers use the impoverished context to categorize White faces as part of a poor White subtype, this should influence not only recognition but also categorization responses; the drop in SR face recognition should occur most strongly for the targets categorized as impoverished Whites. For White perceivers, Black faces are categorized as outgroups regardless of socioeconomic status. Therefore, recognition should not be affected. In other words, we should see identical interaction patterns regardless of whether we rely directly on the poverty implications of the contexts or on participants' own categorizations of the targets.
Method Participants and Design
Thirty-one White Miami University undergraduates (18 females, mean age = 18.90 years) participated in exchange for partial course credit. Three participants were eliminated because they performed near or below chance in at least one experimental condition. 4 The design replicated Experiment 1a, with a 2 (target race: Black vs. White) × 2 (target context: wealthy vs. impoverished) repeated measures design.
Materials and Procedure
Stimuli were nearly identical to those used in the previous experiment except that three impoverished context images were replaced with stimuli that more clearly connoted poverty. Additional pretesting with Miami undergraduates (N = 10) on all stimuli again found that the wealthy backgrounds (M = 5.82, SD = 0.24) were rated as implying substantially more wealth than impoverished backgrounds (M = 2.36, SD = 0.43), t(9) = 19.39, p < .001, d = 6.13.
The procedure for Experiment 1b was nearly identical to that of Experiment 1a with one critical difference. During encoding, after the 7-s viewing phase for each context and face, participants were asked to immediately categorize the just-seen face as "White," "White trash," "Black," or "Black trash" using the keyboard.
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Immediately following a response, the next trial began. We presumed that many perceivers may be hesitant to employ derogatory category labels such as "White trash" or "Black trash." To minimize social desirability, participants were instructed to base their decision not on personal beliefs but rather on how the "average Miami student is likely to view each person."
Results and Discussion

Frequency of Category Use
Our first hypothesis was that the context (wealthy, impoverished) should directly influence participants' tendency to categorize the faces using the "trash" label, across race. Thus, impoverished contexts should elicit "trash" categorizations more often than wealthy contexts. To test this hypothesis, the frequency of "trash" categorizations were calculated separately for Black and White faces presented in both impoverished and wealthy contexts. These scores were then submitted to a 2 (target race: Black vs. White) × 2 (target context: wealthy vs. impoverished) repeated measures ANOVA. As predicted, the ANOVA revealed a substantial effect of context on the frequency of "trash" categorizations, F(1, 23) = 105.10, p < .001, d = 21.45, such that the "trash" categories were used more frequently when faces were presented on impoverished backgrounds (M = 6.02, SD = 1.31) than on wealthy backgrounds (M = 1.27, SD = 1.33). No other significant effects were predicted nor found, Fs < 1.
Recognition Sensitivity
Second, and more importantly, we hypothesized that faces categorized as White would be better recognized than faces categorized as poor White, or similar exclusionary subtypes. To test this hypothesis, we conducted two separate analyses: one based on participants' own categorization responses and a second based on the contexts themselves (i.e., directly replicating the analyses from Experiment 1a). We hypothesized that poor White faces would be poorly recognized, regardless of whether this was calculated based on participants' categorizations or directly on the categories implied by the contexts themselves.
Recognition as a function of participants' categorizations.
To test the hypothesis that participants' own categorization responses of faces into ingroup and outgroup categories would influence the CRE, separate sensitivity parameters (d′) were calculated for recognition of faces in each category (White, White trash, Black, and Black trash). Preliminary analyses confirmed our suspicion that some Whites may be unwilling to use potentially derogatory category labels such as "White trash." Three participants were particularly reluctant to use this category, using it for fewer than half of the impoverished White faces. Given that this analysis relies on participants' willingness to use all category labels, these participants were removed from analyses. 6 Analyses were thus based on the remaining 24 participants. Just as in Experiment 1a, contexts were not observed at recognition; as such, the sensitivity scores were based on overall false alarm rates within each target race.
The sensitivity scores built on participants' own categorizations were then submitted to a 2 (target race: Black vs. White) × 2 (categorization: trash vs. not trash) repeated measures ANOVA. Again replicating the CRE, there was a marginally significant main effect of target race, F(1, 23) = 3.00, p = .10, which was qualified by the predicted Target Race × Categorization interaction, F(1, 23) = 5.12, p = .03. As seen in Figure 3 Recognition as a function of context. Although we found direct support for the hypothesis that participants' own categorizations have direct implications for SR recognition, the strong version of our hypothesis is that SR recognition should be debilitated regardless of whether we rely directly on the poverty implications of the contexts or on participants' own categorizations.
To test this hypothesis, we analyzed the data from Experiment 1b based directly on the contexts themselves rather than on participants' categorizations. Sensitivity scores were submitted to a 2 (target race: Black vs. White) × 2 (target context: wealthy vs. impoverished) repeated measures ANOVA. As seen in Figure  3 (bottom panel), this ANOVA yielded the predicted Target Race × Target Context interaction, F(1, 23) = 8.14, p < .01. Replicating Experiment 1a, presenting White faces on impoverished backgrounds (M = 1.54, SD = 0.50) lead to substantially worse recognition than when those same faces were presented on wealthy backgrounds (M = 1.96, SD = 0.61), t(23) = 4.33, p < .001, d = 0.88. Again, White faces on impoverished backgrounds were recognized just as poorly as both impoverished and wealthy Black faces (ps > .75), and again, the context had no effect for CR recognition (p > .80).
The results Experiment 1b augment those of Experiment 1a in two important ways. First, and most importantly, Experiment 1b again replicated the fragility of the SR recognition advantage. Holding constant perceptual expertise with the faces, when middle-class Whites categorize White faces as White trash, these faces are recognized no better than members of racial outgroups. In fact, recognition performance drops to CR levels. Critically, because the White faces are counterbalanced across conditions, a priori, perceptual expertise with these faces is equated, meaning that the current findings seem at conflict with perceptual expertise models of the CRE. In contrast, these results conform closely to a social-cognitive model in which ingroup versus outgroup categorizations underlie the CRE: When SR faces are categorized as outgroup members, recognition is no different than for stimuli that are de facto outgroup members (i.e., CR faces). Second, Experiment 1b helps demonstrate the robustness of our results. The same pattern of data emerged as in Experiment 1a, regardless of whether participants' own categorizations or the implied categorizations based on the Race × Context combinations were used.
EXPERIMENT 2
Despite the consistency of the observed results with the predictions of the social-cognitive model of the CRE, some concerns with the initial experiments may still arise. First, the context images selected as stimuli in the initial experiments may allow for alternative explanations for the observed results. For example, the context images may vary in important dimensions other than their poverty implications, which could explain our results. The impoverished contexts may have been more complicated and thus have been more distracting than the wealthy contexts. Some impoverished contexts included graffiti and other complex stimuli that were not observed in the wealthy contexts. Alternatively, other stimulus features, such as the potentially threatening nature of some impoverished contexts may have distracted participants, explaining the degraded recognition in the White trash condition.
A second potential concern with the initial experiments is that we relied on the contexts to imply (rather than to explicitly declare) the ingroup or outgroup status for the SR faces. We relied on our middle-class White participants to spontaneously categorize the White faces in wealthy contexts as ingroup members but to subtype the White faces in impoverished contexts as poor White, a devalued outgroup. Although the results of Experiment 1b indicate that perceivers do make such categorizations, and that such categorizations influence recognition, the results are based on the group status implied by the context. Thus, an open question remains as to whether these same results would occur when SR faces are explicitly categorized as ingroup members versus outgroup members.
To address these concerns, we conducted another experiment in which the context was manipulated as minimally as possible, while explicitly categorizing SR and CR faces along an additional ingroup-outgroup dimension. In this procedure (adapted from Bernstein et al., 2007) , we again showed Black and White faces to middle-class White participants. Just as in the previous experiments, these faces were presented on different backgrounds. In this experiment, however, the backgrounds consisted only of red or green squares that were ostensibly indicative of the target's university affiliation: Faces on red backgrounds were ostensibly fellow Miami University undergraduates, whereas faces on green backgrounds were ostensibly Marshall University undergraduates (a perennial football rival). Thus, rather than relying on wealthy faces to be categorized as ingroup members and impoverished faces to be categorized as outgroup members, ingroup versus outgroup status was explicitly specified using the university affiliation of the target. As with the previous experiments, faces were counterbalanced to equate a priori expertise with faces across conditions. Drawing on the socialcognitive model, we predicted that SR recognition would be strong for White faces explicitly labeled as ingroup members (i.e., fellow Miami University students) but that there would be a substantial drop in recognition performance for those same White faces when labeled as outgroup members (i.e., students at a rival university). For Black (i.e., CR) faces, we predicted university affiliation would have little influence on recognition, with relatively poor CR recognition across contexts.
Method Participants and Design
Forty-nine White Miami University undergraduates (42 females) participated in exchange for partial course credit. This experiment employed a 2 (target race: Black vs. White) × 2 (target affiliation: Miami University vs. Marshall University) repeated measures design.
Materials
Eighty grayscale photos of male, college-aged faces (40 Black, 40 White), displaying neutral expressions, resized to approximately 2.25 × 1.5 in. were used as the stimuli (no faces were of actual Miami University or Marshall University students). Each face was placed on a 3 × 3 in. red or green background. The university name ("Miami University" for red backgrounds, "Marshall University" for green backgrounds) was inscribed in white lettering at the bottom of each background (red and green are the school colors for Miami and Marshall, respectively; see Bernstein et al., 2007 , for a similar methodology).
Procedure
The procedure of Experiment 2 was nearly identical to that of the previous experiments except as noted. Before the learning phase, participants were instructed that they would see 40 faces on the computer screen and were asked to attend closely to these faces for later recognition. Participants were further instructed that the faces were of either Miami University or Marshall University students, with faces on red backgrounds being fellow Miami University students (ingroup members) and faces on green backgrounds being Marshall University students (outgroup members).
During the learning phase, 20 Black and 20 White faces were presented on Miami University and Marshall University backgrounds, 10 faces per race-university combination. The faces were displayed in a different random order for each participant. Each face appeared at the center of the computer screen for 2 s, with a 500-ms interstimulus interval. Faces were counterbalanced so that each face was equally likely to be presented as a Miami University or Marshall University student and was equally likely to be seen during the learning phase for each participant.
During the recognition phase, participants saw 40 novel faces (20 Black, 20 White) equally distributed across the Miami University and Marshall University backgrounds as well as the 40 faces seen during encoding. Unlike the previous experiments, the Miami University and Marshall University backgrounds were present at both encoding and recognition. Again, faces were presented in a different random order for each participant. Each face remained on the screen until the participants responded via keyboard button press, after which the next face appeared.
Results and Discussion
As with the previous experiments, we predicted that the CRE is an outgrowth of categorizing individuals as ingroup and outgroup members. Thus, we hypothesized that when SR White faces were categorized as ingroup members (Miami University students), recognition would be strong. In contrast, when those identical SR White faces were categorized as outgroup members (Marshall University students) recognition would suffer, holding constant perceptual expertise with the faces. Consistent with the findings of the previous experiments, we hypothesized that university affiliation would have little influence on CR recognition.
To test these hypotheses, sensitivity (d′) scores were calculated separately for each of the experimental conditions. Unlike the previous experiments, in Experiment 2 the university backgrounds were present at recognition as well as encoding. Thus, in Experiment 2, false alarms could be computed within both race and ingroup and outgroup status, providing more conventional indexes of d′. These sensitivity indexes were submitted to a 2 (target race: Black vs. White) × 2 (target affiliation: Miami University vs. Marshall University) repeated measures ANOVA. As with the previous experiments, a significant main effect of target race was found, F(1, 48) = 16.72, p < .001, again replicating the CRE. As seen in Figure 4 , however, this main effect was again qualified by the predicted Race × Affiliation interaction, F(1, 48) = 4.84, p = .03.
As predicted, White targets categorized as Miami students (i.e., ingroup members) were better recognized than White targets categorized as Marshall students (i.e. These results yield several important findings that not only closely replicate our previous results but also are clearly consistent with the social-cognitive model of the CRE. Most importantly, an explicit outgroup label for SR faces elicited a drop in SR recognition, again indicating the fragility of SR recognition to categorization as an outgroup member. More specifically, recognition of White targets was reliably reduced when these faces were categorized as outgroup members, a result that further supports the evidence found in Experiments 1a and 1b, which suggested that when White targets are presented to SR participants in a context that appears to exclude them from the ingroup, recognition for these faces is meaningfully reduced. Unlike the previous studies, however, the reduction in SR recognition due to outgroup categorization did not completely eliminate the CRE, an issue discussed in the General Discussion. Lastly, in line with the previous studies, university affiliation had no influence on recognition for Black faces. Just as wealthy or impoverished contexts had no influence on CR recognition, so too university affiliations were impotent to influence CR recognition.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In summary, the same pattern of results emerged regardless of whether the targets were categorized based on the contexts themselves (Experiments 1a and 1b), participants' own categorizations (Experiment 1b), or explicit category labels (Experiment 2). When SR faces were seen on backgrounds that indicated they were outgroup members (poor Whites in Experiments 1a and 1b, or Marshall University students in Experiment 2), accuracy in SR face recognition was significantly reduced. Treating the data meta-analytically across the three experiments, we see that this drop in SR recognition is clearly a robust effect (d = 0.38, p < .01). Critically, these findings support the central predictions derived from social-cognitive research and theory that suggest that the CRE is an outgrowth of basic social categorization and not necessarily differential levels of expertise with SR and CR faces. Indeed, the Race × Context interaction, observed across all three experiments occurred even though the a priori perceptual expertise with targets was held constant across groups. By comparing the drop in outgroup SR recognition to CR recognition, we were able to provide novel empirical evidence linking the CRE to similar face recognition biases that occur for outgroup targets more generally, thus demonstrating the important role of categorization in the CRE. Although the previous theory and research suggests categorization may play a causal role in the CRE (Bernstein et al., 2007; Hugenberg et al., 2007; Sporer, 2001) , the current research yields the critical empirical evidence necessary to directly test this provocative hypothesis.
Social Categorization Influences Face Recognition
At a broader level, the results of the current experiments may offer meaningful insight into the social-cognitive nature of recognition biases in general. As discussed previously, past research has found that outgroups are considered more homogeneous on trait ratings than are ingroups (Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989) . The findings presented here suggest a similar phenomenon occurs in face recognition. When SR faces are categorized as outgroup members, they are recognized less accurately than when identical faces are categorized as ingroup members, implying a heightened perception of homogeneity for outgroup targets. Alternatively, these data can be discussed in terms of ingroup heterogeneity rather than outgroup homogeneity. In the current research, our middle-class White participants appear to have a variegated enough representation of their racial ingroup to categorize SR targets as either White or as an exclusionary poor White subtype, which then has an effect on subsequent recognition. For Black targets, however, neither indirect (context) nor direct (university affiliation) manipulations of ingroup or outgroup status appear to be sufficient to influence recognition. Thus, although the White participants categorize Black targets using categories such as Black and Black trash, those categorizations seem to have no implications for recognition. Even though White perceivers are perfectly willing to subtype Black targets (Experiment 1b), at least for the subtypes used in the current research, those differential categorizations had little influence on recognition. Treated meta-analytically across the studies, social context or subtype categorization of CR faces had no effect on recognition (d = 0.10, p = .61). These findings, however, are clearly in line with the social-cognitive model of the CRE. As long as Whites categorize the CR targets as outgroup members, be they wealthy Black, poor Black, or anything in between, this outgroup categorization should debilitate recognition.
Furthermore, the current research adds to the literature on the primacy of certain social categories in social cognition. Classic theory in social cognition (Brewer, 1988) speculated that certain biologically based, perceptually evident social categories, such as sex, race, or age, may dominate categorization across many different contexts. The fact that these categories are so easily perceptually available, and are of such high informational value across situations, may mean they can be hard to ignore. For example, Stangor et al. (1992) found that perceivers commonly and spontaneously categorize targets along the lines of race (and sex), even though it is not necessarily a contextually useful category distinction. Race categorization is important, especially when encoding CR targets, potentially relegating additional social cues related to ingroup membership to a secondary status, at least in the context of encoding faces.
The effect of context on ingroup and outgroup categorization for SR faces found in the current studies also demonstrates the variability and fluidity of such categorizations. While past research has typically shown context effects cause alterations in evaluations of outgroup and CR targets (e.g., Barden et al., 2004) , the present results show that, at least for face recognition, context has a drastic and meaningful effect on SR targets as well. Information about social targets is not encoded in a vacuum, and the context in which a perceiver encounters others can betray clues as to their group membership. As our results demonstrate, contextual factors are important for determining the ingroup or outgroup status of SR individuals and the subsequent recognition of these individuals. In fact, treating the data meta-analytically across the three experiments reveals that outgroup specifying contexts drive recognition for SR faces down to levels close to those observed for CR faces (d = 0.26, p = .07).
The ecological validity of the context manipulations used in Experiments 1a and 1b also affords the current research an applied relevance. The legal consequences of flawed recognition have been well studied within the context of the CRE (Scheck, Neufeld, & Dwyer, 2000) . However, the current work suggests that real-world outgroup-specifying contexts can lead to similar problems, even for SR targets. For example, an impoverished White person may expect to be recognized poorly by any observer so long as that observer believes them to be in a devalued "lower-class" outgroup. Furthermore, this categorization may occur based on a target's mere presence in a particular setting, regardless of whether the target is actually a member of the group implied by the context. Future research will be necessary to more fully explore these possibilities and their applied implications.
The Role of Perceptual Expertise in Recognition Biases
While the results of the current studies are congenial with social-cognitive models of the CRE, and seem at odds with a strong perceptual expertise account of the phenomenon, the potential influence of perceptual expertise cannot be ignored. Indeed, a perceptual expertise model of the CRE could potentially explain multiple phenomena in the current research.
First, the failure of context to influence the recognition of CR faces in the current research could be amenable to an expertise model: The lack of perceptual expertise with CR faces may limit any ability for context to improve CR recognition. Although this explanation does fit the current data, it cannot account for recent evidence that recognition for CR faces can be improved by simple social-cognitive manipulations. Hugenberg et al. (2007) recently found that merely instructing White perceivers to attend to the individuating characteristics in Black faces was sufficient to improve the recognition of CR faces to the point that it was equal to recognition for SR faces. Simply instructing perceivers to individuate CR faces appears sufficient to eliminate the CRE. In the face of this evidence, arguing that a lack of perceptual expertise alone can explain the ineffectual influence of context on CR recognition in the current data seems problematic.
Second, and perhaps more tenable, is the possibility that the reduction in SR recognition (at least in Experiments 1a and 1b) may be due to expertise itself. Although most expertise models describe expertise in terms of experience with SR faces themselves, it is possible that expertise with SR faces includes both greater expertise with SR faces and greater expertise with the contexts in which those faces typically appear. Although this is possible, it requires a substantial redefinition of what most perceptual expertise models would label as expertise. Even this retrenched perceptual expertise model, however, is not entirely consistent with the current data. Although relatively well-off Whites may have more expertise processing White faces in contexts that imply wealth, it seems less plausible that they have differential expertise processing White faces on red and green backgrounds. Indeed, red and green backgrounds themselves have no influence on recognition (Bernstein et al., 2007) . It is only when those backgrounds are infused with meaning, by labeling them as ingroup and outgroup specifying, that these contexts influence recognition.
Despite the difficulty of perceptual expertise models to clearly predict the moderation of SR recognition by social context, perceptual expertise theories may remain viable in other ways. One instantiation posits that the greater expertise with SR faces elicits different processes to encode SR and CR faces. Some theorists argue that SR faces are processed holistically, whereas CR faces are processed in a feature-based manner, and that these different encoding strategies account for the differential recognition (Michel et al., 2006; Rhodes et al., 1989) . Recently, Palermo and Rhodes (2002) argued that holistic processing is a resource-dependent process, requiring attentional allocation. If true, the drop in SR recognition observed here may result from outgroup SR faces not being allocated the attention needed to be processed holistically (and thus to elicit the strong recognition typical of SR faces). Although provocative, tests of such differential processing claims lie beyond the scope of the current work.
The Sovereignty of Social-Cognition in the CRE
Overall, the results of the current research, in concert with other recent findings, seem to limit the explanatory power of perceptual expertise theories. We believe a more parsimonious explanation of the data relies more on classic social-cognitive processes, with the CRE being a natural outgrowth of the tendency to differentially attend to, individuate, and otherwise process individuals categorized as ingroup and outgroup members. Thus, differential reliance on categorization and individuation for CR and SR faces sets into motion a cascade of processes that culminates in the CRE. This is consistent with our own evidence that social context can influence categorization and thereby recognition. Also consistent with this notion is recent evidence showing that categorizing an ambiguous-race face as a racial ingroup member is sufficient to improve recognition, whereas identifying the identical individual as a racial outgroup member degrades recognition (MacLin & Malpass, 2001) . Further supporting our argument is the finding that individuation alone, absent any additional perceptual expertise with CR faces, is sufficient to eliminate the CRE . Although all of this evidence suggests that social-cognitive models may be able to explain the CRE, to the best of our knowledge, the current research is the first to definitively show that recognition can be similarly debilitated when targets are categorized as outgroup members, regardless of whether this outgroup distinction is one of race or some other group membership. In concert with this other evidence, we believe that the current research provides strong initial evidence for the sovereignty of social cognitive variables in the CRE.
Despite the apparent strength of a social-cognitive model to describe the CRE, there is still much work to be done, especially in specifying the mechanisms by which categorization versus individuation elicits differential recognition of ingroup and outgroup faces. Sporer (2001) , in his review of the existing literature, outlines a number of means by which social categorization can elicit superior SR (or more broadly, ingroup) recognition. First, ingroup and outgroup categorizations may change the way attention is allocated (Levin, 1996 (Levin, , 2000 , with ingroup targets eliciting a search for individuating characteristics (i.e., characteristics that distinguish between one individual and another) and outgroup targets eliciting a different search pattern for category-specifying characteristics, or for similarity more broadly (i.e., characteristics that distinguish the individual as a member of the category). Alternately, perhaps the activation of semantically related social category information (e.g., stereotypic expectancies) may bias the perception of outgroup targets. Given that describing a face from memory debilitates later recognition (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990 ), insofar as semantic information activated for outgroup members includes featural information, this could lead to problematic recognition.
Although both of these mechanisms remain tenable, the current results may be most parsimoniously explained by cognitive disregard (Rodin, 1987) , or the tendency to simply ignore individuals who do not serve current goals. This argument is congruent with social-cognitive evidence suggesting that critical person characteristics are not processed in many social situations (e.g., Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, & Castelli, 1997) . Indeed, many individuals in our environment may be treated as interchangeable functionaries insofar as they are irrelevant to goal pursuit. Put simply, recognizing ingroup members may be more important than recognizing outgroup members in many situations. Whatever the specific mechanism underlying the CRE, the current research undeniably adds to the growing evidence that social-cognitive processes elicited by categorization are clearly implicated in this robust, but poorly understood, phenomenon.
NOTES
1. Miami University students are, on average, wealthy with a median family income of well above $100,000 per year (Cooperational Institutional Research Program, 2005) . More than 93% of students report family income in excess of the U.S. median family income (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007) .
2. Across all experiments, counterbalancing had no effects, with the exception of a Context × Set interaction in Experiment 1a.
3. After converting frequencies to probabilities, probabilities of 1 were replaced with .95, and probabilities of 0 were replaced with .05, a correction necessary to calculate d ′.
4. One participant was eliminated because recognition of targets categorized as White trash was near chance (d ′ = 0.06). Although this participant conforms to our hypotheses, excluding this participant provides a conservative test. Also, data from one trial wherein a White target was categorized as Black were excluded from analyses.
5. Although this terminology can be considered derogatory, we employed these labels because discussions with participants indicated many spontaneously use such labels during encoding, and the use of "trash" labeling can be used to distance oneself from others (Lott, 2002) . The authors do not endorse the use of such labels. Although the racial implications of the "trash" label may differ when applied to White and Black targets (Wilson, 2002) , participants did use the "Black trash" label. Thus, this does not pose a problem for our interpretation.
6. Retaining these participants in analyses yields nearly identical results.
